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RISK ANALYSIS IN GEOTECHNICAL AND EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING:  




Dr. D. N. D. Hartford 





The nature of risk analysis as applied to earthfill dams for the purpose of safety assessment is examined with particular reference to 
the matter of demonstrating the scientific validity of risk constructs used to inform important dam safety decisions. The qualities and 
attributes of what would be considered to be transparent, credible and defensible risk analyses for dam safety decision-making are 
outlined.  A conceptual approach to addressing the problem of quantifying internal erosion risk that combines critical state soil 
mechanics theory and dynamic event tree analysis is proposed.  Finally, an experiment aimed at assessing contemporary capability to 




I am honoured to once again present my perspective on the 
State-of the Art and Practice of Risk Analysis for 
Embankment Dams.  This lecture also provides me with an 
opportunity to reflect on developments in the domain over the 
past forty five years and over the past fifteen in particular. It is 
the last fifteen years that are of particular interest as risk 
analysis in dam safety assessment has gained greater 
acceptance, to the extent that dam safety programs are now 
seen as somewhat lacking if they don’t have some element of 
risk-based thinking explicitly identified as part of the safety 
management process. Importantly, this lecture gives me the 
opportunity to explore where, in our enthusiasm to establish 
risk assessment in dam safety practice, we might not have got 
things quite right.   
 
One area of particular concern is the respective roles of 
mathematics, scientific inference, and judgement, in the risk 
analysis process. I have used the term “judgement” as opposed 
to “engineering judgement”, because probability resides in the 
domain of the philosophy of science and risk analysis of 
engineered systems (including dams) pertains to analysis of 
the mechanics of failure processes which pertain to physics 
and not to engineering design and construction where 
engineering judgement is essential.  Mathematics which is 
central to good engineering is also central to risk analysis, 
although the types of mathematics may be different. Because 
of the complex probabilistic nature of the mathematics of risk 
analysis, one would expect that mathematics would be at the 
core of risk analysis practice. Yet for some reason the 
mathematics is often conspicuous in its absence, or reduced to 
a trivial form.  Central to my lecture is how do we address the 
type of criticism of engineering judgments of probability 
levelled by the distinguished Nobel physics laureate, Prof. R. 
P. Feynman which went “As Far as I can tell, ‘engineering 
judgment’ means that they are going to just make up the 





Earth dams and other earthen water retaining structures have 
been essential elements of human development over the 
millennia. In many respects the discoveries of how to 
construct dams of different types in response to the social and 
political demands for the management of water resources in 
the public interest, have had some of the most profound 
impacts on human development. Very recently in the history 
of dams, soil mechanics has played a major role in the 
engineering design, construction and safety assessment of 
large dams.  Sadly, dam failures can and do occur and it is an 
unfortunate fact that dam failures have resulted in more 
fatalities than the failure of any other peacetime industrial 
artefact. Thus understanding failure modes of dams is 
necessary to manage their safety. 
 
Dam failure is terrifying; and the questions “is the dam safe?”; 
“what will happen if the dam fails?”; and, “are the 
consequences of dam failure manageable?” are central to the 
management of existing dams and water retaining structures in 
the modern context.  However, despite the existence of earth 
dams and water retaining structures over the millennia, 
methods of answering these questions in transparent and 
scientifically-based ways have only begun to emerge over the 
past few years. How these questions are answered, and how 
robust and defensible the answers are, depends in many 
respects on whom you consult. 
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Decisions to build dams and the safety standards to which 
dams should perform are fundamentally matters of politics 
even though traditionally engineers have assumed a 
significant, even total responsibility for these matters.  
Whether or not this assumption of this responsibility – usually 
because the political process either expects it or because 
engineers have assumed this responsibility within a political 
vacuum – is not the subject of this paper, rather the paper 
explores some of the dimensions required for engineers to be 
properly equipped to enter into debate in the social-political 
arena that increasingly mistrusts “experts” and demands 
transparency and scientific validity.    
 
Assessing the safety of a dam requires that the engineer make 
inferences from incomplete and uncertain data.  To do this the 
engineer necessarily must hypothesise, and then draw 
conclusions recognising that a hypothesis is a basis for 
reasoning without any presumption of its truth.  In many 
instances, dam safety engineers are not dealing solely with 
facts – the entire safety assessment process is inferential and 
utilises inductive logic. Inductive logic pertains to arguments 
that are not certain, and inductive logic analyses inductive 
arguments (hypotheses) using probability.   
 
This State-of-the Art and Practice lecture attempts to focus on 
unravelling the problem of how and how well these issues can 
be answered. As such, and unlike my previous State-of-the-
Art and Practice lecture in 2001 (Hartford, 2001), I will not 
deal with the specifics of how to apply State-of-the-Art or 
State-of-the-Practice (if there is a difference) methods of risk 
analysis to individual dams. 
 
I do not propose to discuss the “State-of-the-Art and Practice” 
in the analysis of the behaviour of earth dams under dynamic 
and static loading conditions as others have already provided 
comprehensive treatments of the “state-of-the-practice” in the 
two domains of interest, seismic analysis of embankment 
dams and internal erosion of dams under static loading 
conditions.    Dr. W. F. Marcuson III and his colleagues 
(Marcuson et. al, 2007) provided an exemplary account of the 
state-of-the-practice in embankment dam analysis for seismic 
conditions; and Professors Robin Fell (Fell et al., 2005) and 
his colleagues have provided a comprehensive account of the 
Geotechnical Engineering of Dams. Professors Fell and Fry 
(Fell and Fry, 2007) have described what might be considered 
to the State-of-the-Art of analysis of the propensity for internal 
erosion, although, in terms of the above definitions this would 
be state-of-the-practice. 
 
Comparison of the state-of-the-practice in embankment dam 
analysis for seismic conditions with the invited workshop 
consensus view of the state-of-the-art of internal erosion 
analysis as presented by Fell and Fry reveals a stark difference 
between the “states” of the practice for the two failure modes.  
The state of the art for the internal erosion failure mode is 
extremely weak in comparison with that of the seismic failure 
mode (which itself is hardly sophisticated).  In fact, the state-
of- the-art of internal erosion analysis appears lacking of any 
soil mechanics equations!  That there is such an imbalance 
between the analytical capabilities for these two failure modes 
should be of great concern particularly since internal erosion 
has been the cause of approximately 48% of historic 
embankment dam failures.  Overtopping failures have been the 
cause of approximately 48% of failures with all other failure 
modes including seismic contributing just 4% of the total (the 
figure for “other” goes up to 17% if tailings dams are included 
(USSD, 1994)). 
 
Concerning risk analysis as applied to dams, ICOLD Bulleting 
130 (ICOLD, 2005) contains a reconnaissance of risk analysis 
practices around the world.  Further, I gave as complete an 
account of risk analysis of dams under dynamic conditions as I 
could in my State-of-the-Art and Practice lecture in 2001 
(Hartford ibid); and there have not been any significant 
fundamental discoveries in the soil mechanics of embankment 
dams since then. 
 
 
Figure 1. Embankment dam failure statistics 
(approximate) (Foster et al, 1998) 
  
Obviously, this last point is debatable as no doubt there are 
researchers working at a fundamental level in the science of 
soil mechanics who would claim otherwise, and I don’t want 
to discount their work in any way.  Notwithstanding all of this, 
in practice the soil mechanics that underpins the analysis of 
the performance of dams has not changed in any significant 
way over the past 20 or more years.  The lack of any soil 
mechanics models and equations in the “State of the art of 
assessing the likelihood of internal erosion of embankment 
dams, water retaining structures and their foundations” (Fell 
and Fry, ibid.) means that it is not possible to deal with the 
problem of internal erosion risk analysis in a scientifically 
meaningful way.  There is other work in this domain e.g. 
Sellmeijer and Koenders which provides a mathematical 
model for piping under a dam (Koenders and Sellmeijer, 1992, 
Sellmeijer and Koenders, 1991) and the work of Ojha et al. 
(2001).  
 
Against this background, my focus is on risk analysis 
techniques as they apply in dam safety assessment and some 
of the challenges that have yet to be overcome.  This is 
followed by an outline of a conceptual approach to addressing 
the problem of quantifying internal erosion risk that combines 
critical state soil mechanics theory and dynamic event tree 
analysis.  Finally, an experiment aimed at assessing 
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contemporary capability to detect the “changes of state” is 
described. 
 
PART I  
RISK ANALYSIS 
 
THE NATURE OF RISK ANALYSIS 
 
Risk analysis is one of two classic decision support models 
that can be used to help structure and inform complex choices 
under uncertainty, the second being “decision analysis”.  Risk 
analysis is the process of characterising the risk associated 
with the system of interest and in some cases it can be 
extended to include the identification and benefit assessment 
of some risk management options. It is based on systems 
analysis and probability, and it excludes the actual decision 
phase, which requires risk evaluation and risk assessment 
(Hartford and Baecher, 2004). While the text Risk and 
Uncertainty in Dam Safety refers specifically to dams in the 
title, many of the concepts, theoretical considerations and 
methods apply across the domain of the built environment, 
and beyond to engineered systems in general. 
 
As explained in Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety, risk 
analysis and decision analysis have some similarities and are 
often complementary. Both risk analysis and decision analysis 
rely on probability theory to model uncertainties, usually the 
subjective or Bayesian degree of belief interpretation of 
probability. In risk management, risk analysis and decision 
analysis are often inter-related because a decision analysis 
may include a risk analysis as one of its constituent parts, and 
the design of a risk management plan may require decision 
analysis support. The challenge for risk analysts is to 
characterize potential failure problems before decision options 
have been identified, and when there is no single decision 
maker, or group of decision makers, who can provide 
preference functions and degrees of belief. Yet, a correct and 
complete model of uncertainties in the probabilistic risk 
analysis phase is important if the results are to be used later 
for decision support, especially when the number of systems 
involved and the duration of their operations is unknown 
(Paté-Cornell and Dillon, 2006). These considerations are 
pertinent to dams and geotechnical structures in general, 
especially when the consequences of a bad decision are 
potentially catastrophic or where the effects of a decision have 
lasting impact on the performance of the system. 
 
These distinctions and interrelationships between risk analysis 
and decision analysis; between decision support and risk 
management; and particularly the risk characterisation 
function of risk analysis are important because they are often 
mixed in common usage.  The words of risk analysis have 
presented opportunities for confusion for many years (Kaplan, 
1997) as they are used differently in different professions and 
domains.  In some cases, the term risk analysis is employed in 
a way such that it includes risk assessment, risk management 
and risk communication (e.g. OGTR, 2005). The diversity of 
 
use of the term “risk” ranges from “risk = probability” in the 
healthcare industry to “risk = consequence” in the insurance 
industry.  In engineering, risk is taken as: 
 
Risk = Probability x Consequence 
 
The potential for misinterpretation and misunderstanding goes 
far beyond the definition of the risk as the term probability, 
which is fundamental to risk analysis means different things to 
different people and it is very difficult to obtain precise 
information as to what people mean when they use the term 
probability.  In the domain of geotechnical and earthquake 
engineering, even the terms Bayesian probability, subjective 
probability and degree of belief probability present problems.  
For some, the term Bayesian does require the formal 
application of Bayes Theorem, whereas others refer to a 
Bayesian probability approach that does not require the actual 






The matter of the scientific validity of the results of risk 
analyses of dams has always been a contentious issue. The 
suggestion that risk analyses of dams should be credible and 
defensible (Hartford and Salmon, 1997), were met with 
scepticism and even outright resistance.  However, I was 
simply drawing attention to the fact that there are increasing 
demands for all types of risk assessment to be scientifically 
based.  Miss J. Bacon, the former Director general of the UK 
Health and Safety Executive expressed the view that,  “the 
task of the risk regulator - and of the scientific and 
engineering communities - is to reassert the concepts of 
justified risk and of ‘safe enough’; to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of good science and technology in providing 
robust systems of risk management and control; and to make 
transparent the process undertaken for arriving at scientific 
judgements and engineering decisions” (Bacon, 1999).  
 
In the same paper, Miss Bacon noted “20 years ago an 
eminent engineer in the UK suggested that:  Engineering is 
the art of moulding materials that we do not wholly 
understand into shapes we cannot precisely analyse, so as to 
withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that 
the community at large has no reason to suspect the extent of 
our ignorance.”  This was accompanied by a clear warning by 
this risk regulator:  “I [J. Bacon] am afraid that 20 years on, 
such black box mysticism in dealing with sources of risk is no 
longer viable.  The credibility of risk prevention and control is 
at stake.”  
 
This emphasis on scientific validity is not peculiar to the UK 
Health and Safety Executive, as the scientific validity of risk 
analyses in Europe is essentially taken as given. Recently, in 
the United States, the Office of Management and Budget 
introduced new guidelines for Federal Agencies performing 
risk assessments (OMB, 2007).   
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(Note, the Office of Management and Budget use the term 
Risk Analysis to include Risk Assessment, Risk Management 
and Risk Communication.)     
 
The memorandum which specifically states that the term 
scientific applies to engineering (footnote 17) sets out a 
number of “Principles for Risk Assessment”.  The first of 
these principles states: “Agencies should employ the best 
reasonably obtainable scientific information to assess risks to 
health, safety, and the environment.” There is a clearly stated 
expectation that risk analyses should be based upon the best 
available scientific methodologies, information, data, and 
weight of the available scientific evidence. Principle 3 states: 
“Judgments used in developing a risk assessment, such as 
assumptions, defaults, and uncertainties, should be stated 
explicitly. The rationale for these judgments and their 
influence on the risk assessment should be articulated.”  
 
Regardless of the differences in risk analysis terminology, 
such demands for scientific validity of risk analyses are real 
and justified and should not come as a surprise. Those 
involved in risk analysis of dams will need to demonstrate the 
scientific validity of their practices to pass regulatory and 
public scrutiny.  How dam owners and their engineers respond 
to this challenge could well be problematic for some, 
particularly those who resisted and even continue to resist the 
notions of transparency and scientific validity. 
 
Precisely why requirements for demonstrating the scientific 
validity of risk constructs in risk analyses for dams are 
variously overlooked or discounted is not at all clear. The 
Bayesian view of probability is central to risk analysis for dam 
safety and an increasing number of philosophers and scientists 
accept the Bayesian view that “scientific reasoning is 
essentially reasoning in accordance with the formal principles 
of probability” (Howson and Urbach, 1991). I have argued in 
favour of credible and defensible probability assignment for 






Although the concepts of probability and risk have been 
known since the 14th century, they have not found widespread 
use in geotechnical engineering practice until recently, and 
then only to a limited extent.  This might appear to be rather 
strange given that uncertainty is such a dominant factor in 
geotechnical engineering, but the practice has been to adopt 
conservative designs to cater for all of the uncertainties.  
However, it is a simple fact that the extent to which a 
“conservative” solution actually covers all uncertainties and 
eventualities remains unknown.  
 
Uncertainty and randomness 
 
It is necessary to make a clear distinction between randomness 
and uncertainty. 
 
Randomness concerns natural processes that are inherently 
unpredictable. To describe something as random is to presume 
that its occurrence can be described only probabilistically. 
 
Random (adjective). Date: 1565. 1. a: lacking a definite plan, 
purpose, or pattern b: made, done, or chosen at random; 2. a: 
relating to, having, or being elements or events with definite 
probability of occurrence. b: being or relating to a set or to an 
element of a set each of whose elements has equal probability 
of occurrence (Merriam-Webster, 2000). 
 
The role of dice, patterns of the weather, occurrence of an 
earthquake, and other such unpredictable occurrences have 
been called aleatory by Hacking (1975) and others after the 
Latin aleator, meaning “gambler” or “die caster.” This term is 
now widely used in risk analysis, especially in applications 
dealing with seismic hazard, nuclear safety, and severe storms. 
The term probability, when applied to such random events, is 
taken to mean the frequency of occurrence in a long or infinite 
series of similar trials. This frequency is a property of nature, 
independent of anyone’s knowledge of it. It is innate, and has 
a “true” value. Two observers, given the same evidence, and 
enough of it, should eventually converge to the same 
numerical value for this frequency. 
 
The term uncertainty means different things to different 
people and it is difficult to find an unambiguous definition of 
the term.  At least since the 18th century and arguably much 
earlier, the notion of uncertainty has concerned what we 
know. 
 
Uncertain (adjective). Date: 14th century. 1: Indefinite, 
indeterminate 2: not certain to occur: Problematical 3: not 
reliable: Untrustworthy 4 a: not known beyond doubt: 
Dubious b: not having certain knowledge: Doubtful c: not 
clearly identified or defined 5: not constant: Variable, Fitful 
(Merriam-Webster, 2000). 
 
Such unknown things have been called epistemic, after the 
Greek, επιστηµη, meaning “knowledge." This term is now 
widely used in risk analysis, to distinguish imperfect 
knowledge from randomness 
 
The notion of uncertainty is disconcerting to engineers and to 
those they serve.  To engineers, especially those grounded in 
the philosophy of determinism, it perhaps implies a degree of 
ignorance, something that is apparently unacceptable even if it 
is true. It is disconcerting to those who accept engineering 
services because they have become conditioned to expect that 
the engineers they retain know what they are doing with their 
money. 
 
From its dictionary definition, uncertainty means a lack of 
sureness or a lack of confidence about someone or something, 
ranging from falling just short of complete sureness or 
confidence, to an almost complete lack of conviction about an 
outcome or result.  
 
There appears to be three facets to uncertainty: Uncertainty 
with respect to the world means that an outcome or result is 
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unknown or not established and therefore in question. 
Uncertainty with respect to a belief means that a conclusion is 
not proven or is supported by questionable information. 
Uncertainty with respect to a course of action means that a 
plan is not determined or is undecided. The term uncertainty 
has a variety of shades. Each of these express an aspect of 
uncertainty that comes to play somewhere in risk analyses.  
 
In modern practice, risk analysis usually incorporates 
uncertainties of both the aleatory and epistemic types. That is, 
the term uncertainty is used as an over-arching term that 
includes randomness. The National Research Council (1996) 
describes different types of uncertainty, using the following 
terminology: 
 
Aleatory uncertainty is attributed to inherent randomness, 
natural variation, or chance outcomes in the physical world; in 
principle, this uncertainty is irreducible. These uncertainties 
may include things such as stream flows, assumed to be 
random processes in time, and geotechnical properties of 
levees, assumed to be random processes in space. Aleatory 
uncertainty is sometimes called, random variability, stochastic 
variability, objective uncertainty, or external uncertainty or 
natural variability (NRC 2000). 
 
Natural variability associated with the “inherent” randomness 
of natural processes, manifesting as variability over time for 
phenomena that take place at a single location (temporal 
variability), or as variability over space for phenomena that 
take place at different locations but at a single time (spatial 
variability), or as variability over both time and space. Such 
natural variability is approximated using mathematical 
simplifications, or models. These models may or may not 
provide a good fit to natural phenomena. In the best of cases, 
they are close but only approximate fits.  
 
Epistemic uncertainty is attributed to lack of data, lack of 
knowledge about events and processes that limits our ability to 
model the real world. Epistemic uncertainty is sometimes 
called, subjective or internal uncertainty. Epistemic 
uncertainties divide into two major sub-categories: model 
uncertainty and parameter uncertainty. Model uncertainty has 
to do with the degree to which a chosen mathematical model 
accurately mimics reality; parameter uncertainty has to do 
with the precision with which model parameters can be 
estimated. The NRC panel called this, knowledge uncertainty. 
 
Knowledge uncertainty is most commonly associated with 
model and parameter uncertainty. Model uncertainty reflects 
the inability of a model to precisely represent a system's true 
behaviour, or our inability to identify the best model, or a 
model that may be changing in time in poorly known ways 
(e.g., flood-frequency curve changing because of changing 
watershed). Parameter uncertainties result from an inability to 
accurately assess parameter values from test or calibration 
data, from limited numbers of observations, and from the 
statistical imprecision attendant thereto. Parameter 
uncertainties may also arise from data uncertainties, including 
measurement errors, inconsistency of data, transcription 
errors, and inadequate representativeness 
Probability 
 
The term probability, when applied to imperfect knowledge, is 
usually taken to mean the degree of belief in the occurrence of 
an event or the truth of a proposition. In this sense, probability 
is a property of the individual. We may or may not know what 
the value of the probability is, but the probability in question 
can be learned by self-interrogation. There is, by definition, no 
“true” value of this probability. Probability is a mental state, 
and therefore unique to the individual. Two observers, given 
the same evidence, may arrive at different probabilities, and 
neither be wrong. This is one of the dilemmas of probability; 
one never knows the true answer.  One expert might assign a 
probability of 0.1 to the occurrence of an event and another 
might assign a probability of 0.01 to the same event. The 
occurrence or non-occurrence of the event does not negate 
either of these expert’s probabilities. 
 
While the term “degree of belief” is not without its own 
difficulties, and perhaps the term “degree of confidence” 
might be more useful, it is clear that in terms if the “belief” 
interpretation of probability it is not quite right to refer to the 
Probability of Failure of Dam X as something like: 
 
yrAxp bf /
−= 10  
 
Rather, it would be correct to claim that “the degree of 















In short, a dam, or any other structure for that matter does not 
have a “probability of failure” as an intrinsic property. 
 
I would suggest that much of the debate, and on some 
occasions heated arguments, about the role of probability and 
risk in engineering and in the safety assessment of dams in 
particular could have been avoided by this simple.  It is not as 
though it wasn’t known in the mathematical and scientific 
community that “probability doesn’t exist in the real world”, 
it was; but it was not and still isn’t universally accepted.  This 
was particularly true when Casagrande first proposed the 
concept of calculated risk in geotechnical engineering because 
there were several great philosophers such as Sir Karl Popper 




In general, probabilities are assigned to distinctly different 
variables in the risk analysis, (1) chance event variables 
associated with natural variability (also termed aleatory 
uncertainties), and (2) state or condition variables associated 
with knowledge uncertainties (also termed epistemic 
uncertainties). Whether variables are chance variables or state 
variables is an artefact of the model within which the 
probabilities are assigned. Thus the assignment of 
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probabilities is inextricably linked to the model being used to 
characterize the performance of the dam, its loading 
conditions, and the consequences that follow dam failure. 
 
The frequency interpretation of probability is well established 
in engineering practice and the belief interpretation, which one 
suspects has been used implicitly and often unsuspectingly in 
engineering practice, is increasingly being used intentionally 
in engineering. Recent demands for explanation and 
transparency in dealing with uncertainty through risk analysis, 
means that increasingly the belief interpretation is being used 
explicitly. 
 
In parallel to these alternative meanings for the concept of 
probability are alternative approaches to the way inferences 
are drawn from evidence, that is, from statistical data. 
Frequentist statistical inference is a widely applied body of 
doctrine comprising, among other things, estimator theory and 
the theory of significance tests. 
 
Classical frequentist inference evolved in an effort to create an 
‘objective’ appraisal of scientific theories, and treats 
probability as frequencies of random variations in the physical 
world, for example, as the naturally occurring variations 
among experimental results. Howson and Urbach (1991), 
point out that the frequentist theory of estimation, “(…) has 
two branches, known as point estimation and interval 
estimation. Point estimation aims to select a specific number 
as the so-called best estimate of a parameter; it is contrasted in 
the literature with interval estimation, a method of locating the 
parameter within a region and associating a certain degree of 
‘confidence’ with the conclusion that is drawn”. 
 
Inferences about degrees-of-belief, in contrast to frequentist 
inference, are built upon Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem 
describes the degree to which observed evidence should 
logically change a degree of belief (i.e., a probability) held 
before the evidence was observed, to a logically following 
degree of belief after. 
 
Degree-of-belief inference has sometimes been called, 
“subjective probability,” but Kaplan and Garrick (1981) put 
forward the view that the term is misleading, and that it has 
caused confusion and controversy. They put forward the view 
that the battle between the “frequentist school of thought” and 
the “Bayesian school of thought”, has been due to a 
misunderstanding. The root cause being the desire for 
objective science on the part of the ‘frequentist school of 
thought’, a view shared by scientists in general.  
 
Kaplan’s views are not unique, similar arguments concerning 
the objective nature of the Bayesian approach have been put 
forward by other experts in probability and risk, the works of 
Howson and Urbach (ibid.) and Morgan and Henrion (1990) 
being just two examples.  
 
Recently, Hacking (2001) presented the view that there are 
two types of belief probability, the interpersonal/evidential 
type, and the personal type. This distinction permits the 
analyst to reveal the fundamental nature of each probability 
construct, the extent to which probability constructs are 
founded in data and the extent to which a probability has been 
constructed in terms of established logical and mathematical 
principles. 
 
However, the belief interpretation of probability does not 
simply imply that, “a probability is what one believes it to be”. 
As Orkin (2000) points out, “without essential mathematical 
form, anyone can say anything”. Thus, while a loose 
interpretation might be attractive from the perspective of 
facilitating the easy generation of numbers, it has limitations 
and inconsistencies if the belief is not correctly constructed. 
The problems associated with such a limiting interpretation 
can be overcome by adding additional constraints that 
strengthen the interpretation of probability. The result of 
adding such constraints is an interpretation of the form “a 
probability is what the evidence, as correctly assembled in 
terms of the necessary mathematical and scientific principles, 
permits one to believe it to be as a basis for action”. It is this 
combination of all of the information (ranging from objective 
data through rational judgment to entirely subjective senses) in 
a logically consistent way through mathematical procedures 
that provides a probability construct with its essential 
mathematical form.  
 
Against this background, the interpretations of probability as 
belief and probability as frequency are considered to be 
complimentary with both interpretations being necessary 
elements of probability theory as it applies to dam safety risk 
analysis. The interpretations are complimentary and 
scientifically valid when properly applied, and should be 
applied to the appropriate extent. There is no question of the 
two interpretations being mutually exclusive, or one being 
superior in its totality to the other, because the two approaches 
are complimentary, and depending on the situation, the use of 
one interpretation may be more appropriate than the use of the 




EXPERTS, OPINION, JUDGEMENT AND SCIENTIFIC 
VALIDITY  
 
“Engineering judgment” is held at an elevated level of respect 
amongst geotechnical engineers, and while engineers are 
generally held in high esteem by the public, the same public 
increasingly questions whether engineering judgment can be 
relied on to answer questions of public safety.  The 
geotechnical engineering community can no longer rely on the 
paternalistic sentiment embedded in the notion of engineering 
judgment - that professionals know best - because it is out of 
fashion and unjustifiable in the modern context. In recent 
years, US federal government agencies such as the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission have even discouraged the use of the 
term engineering judgment in their deliberations. 
 
Thus while engineering judgment is raised to transcendent 
heights within the geotechnical community, it is often 
questioned by policy makers and the public. Despite the 
benefits provided to society by modern constructed facilities, 
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adverse environmental consequences and other unfavourable 
impacts of those same facilities seem to be more on people’s 
minds. 
 
Within the dam safety community (although not original to it) 
there are at least two schools of thought on what constitutes 
judgment. (1) One holds that judgment reflects a base of 
knowledge held by a person or persons, and manifests in 
quantitative estimates of probabilities or other parameters as a 
reflection of intuition. (2) The other holds that judgment 
reflects an analytical process of reasoning, and manifests in 
quantitative estimates as a reflection of logic. These 
contrasting views of judgment reflect an age-old rivalry 
between the mathematical and the intuitive mind (Berlin and 
Hardy 1980; Berlin et al. 1979); Pascal (1966) even thought 
the two ways of thinking to be incompatible within the same 
person. Nonetheless, each approach is supportable and 
internally consistent, and each relates to the other, but they 
differ in their practical implications. 
 
Within the school of thought that holds judgment to reflect an 
intuitive process, judgment is seen as based on the recognition 
of patterns in the world from which correlates can be 
identified. This is sometimes referred to as the “lens theory” 
and is attributed to Brunswik’s (1952) research on perception 
and cognition (Hammond 1996). Brunswik theorized that 
people do not directly perceive the essence of an object or a 
situation, but rather perceive a set of implicit cues about it 
which may be ill defined. Such cues are statistically related in 
a person’s mind, whether consciously or not, with the essential 
aspects one is attempting to draw a judgment about, and these 
statistical relationships are learned from experience.  
 
Within the school of thought that holds judgment to reflect an 
analytical process, judgment is seen as based on reasoning 
from observations, known facts, and physical principles; 
wherein, reasoning means to determine or conclude something 
by logical thinking. Reasoning is similar to mathematical 
argumentation, but with verbal statements and relationships 
rather than symbolic ones. An important quality of the 
reasoning approach to judgment, in the eyes of its proponents, 
is the paper trail of evidence it leaves to justify conclusions 
that are reached. 
 
Within the normal enterprise of risk analysis, an opinion, in 
contrast to a judgment, is a belief held with confidence but not 
substantiated by positive knowledge, proof, or explicit 
reasoning. This contrasts, and should not be confused with the 
meaning of the term in the legal arena, where an opinion is a 
formal statement by an adjudicative body of the legal reasons 
and principles for a set of conclusions. 
 
Coherence and correspondence 
 
The philosophical world distinguishes between two types of 
truth or judgments: coherence and correspondence (Hammond 
1996). The coherence theory of judgment focuses on whether 
an individual’s judgmental process is internally consistent. 
The correspondence theory focuses on whether an individual’s 
judgments have empirical accuracy. 
The cognitive basis of intuitive judgment is poorly understood. 
Brunswik’s model, which has been the basis of later work by 
Hammond (1996), and others–and which has been cited by 
Parkin (2000), Vick (2002), and others, is based on perception, 
specifically the perception of attributes which Brunswick 
callecd, cues. Such cues are statistically related to objects and 
situations based on experience. When faced with a new object 
or situation, the individual perceives a relatively limited 
number of cues (Brunswik speculates that the number seldom 
exceeds seven) from among the almost limitless possibilities, 
and from these draws conclusions. The cues tend to be 
complex, thus they many not be interpreted in the same way 
each time they are perceived, or they may be perceived 
differently each time. Different people, presumably, perceive 
and interpret cues in different ways, presumably place 
different weights on them, and presumably combine cues in 
different ways, and thus may come to different conclusions 
about the same object or situation.  
 
Hammond combined Brunswik’s model of cues and intuitive 
judgment with reasoning and calculation to form cognitive 
continuum theory. Cognitive continuum theory holds that 
intuitive judgments should be evaluated by the 
correspondence between the weighted average of the cues 
perceived about an object or situation, on the one hand, and 
the critical attributes of the real object or situation they reflect, 
on the other. If these two correspond, then the judgment is said 
to be valid. In contrast, reasoning or calculation should be 
evaluated by the coherence of the model produced. If the parts 
of the model form an internally consistent totality, then the 
reasoning or calculation is said to be valid. The 
correspondence of this logically sound model to physical 
reality is of secondary importance. 
 
Cognitive continuum theory further holds that people do not - 
or cannot - simultaneously think in both correspondence mode 
(intuitive judgment) and coherence mode (reasoning and 
calculation), but rather flip back and forth between these two 
cognitive processes. People form intuitive judgments, then 
subject those judgments to reasoning and calculation, and then 
take the results back into an intuitive correspondence mode, 
and so on, and so on. Hammond calls this, “quasi-rational 
cognition.” In solving a difficult problem, one might first look 
to hunches, intuitive guesses, or premonitions, and then 
subject whatever arises to analytical thought. When the 
analysis becomes bogged down, one might go the other way 
and seek hunches about the analysis. This is something akin to 
Sir Karl Popper’s (1968) hypo-deductive view of the scientific 
method, in which an hypothesis is developed intuitively, but 
then tested deductively. 
 
In practical applications, analytical cognition is both more 
highly accurate on average than is intuitive judgment, yet 
sometimes can be wildly inaccurate. This is unsurprising. 
When underlying assumptions are more or less correct, 
analytical cognition can be both accurate and precise; but 
when those same assumptions are incorrect, the conclusions 
based on analysis can be widely off. Large errors were 
sometimes made in the analytical mode, but research suggests 
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that they are less frequent than in the intuitive mode 
(Hammond 1996). 
 
The confidence that people, both professionals and the public, 
place in a prediction appears to be related to the degree of 
internal consistency that manifests in the arguments or model 




The whole area of obtaining quantitative estimates of 
parameters which cannot readily be quantified through direct 
measurement or other sampling techniques, has changed 
dramatically since Casagrande’s time and even since Whitman 
resurrected Casagrande’s concept (Whitman, 1984) or others 
began to apply the concept in practice in the late 1980’s and 
1990’s. 
 
The introduction of probabilistic concepts for treating 
uncertainty requires an engineer to exercise a form of 
judgment which differs from the conventional professional 
judgment that he (or she) may have developed during his or 
her career through training and practical experience (Brown 
and Aspinall, 2004). This alternative form of judgment, which 
arises in all attempts at estimating probabilities, regardless of 
the domain, is generically termed ‘expert judgment’, and 
involves enumerating subjective probabilities that reflect an 
expert’s degrees of belief. Typically in the practice of risk 
analysis for dam safety (Nielsen et al., 1994, USBR, 1999, 
Vick, 2002, Brown and Godson, 2004, URS, 2007) this 
subjective element in assigning probabilities has often been 
treated, in terms of a limited personal interpretation of 
subjective probability, treated informally (that is without 
formal consideration of coherence and correspondence, or 
ignored altogether. However, requirements for scientific 
validity and methodological advances such as those described 
in Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety are bringing a more 
rigorous form of eliciting judgment increasingly to the 
forefront of risk analysis practices. 
 
The first question that arises in expert judgement elicitation is 




Typically, experts have undergone rigorous intellectual 
training. Experts can be distinguished from non experts by two 
characteristics; specifically their substantive expertise, and 
their normative expertise (Morgan and Henrion, ibid.): 
• “Substantive expertise can be measured by how well a set 
of assessments predicts the actual outcomes; a substantive 
expert should on the average assign high probabilities to 
those events that turn out to occur, and low ones to those 
that do not. 
• Normative expertise is measured through the process of 
calibration. It is also known as reliability.  An assessor is 
said to be well calibrated if the assessed probability of 
events corresponds with their empirical frequency of 
occurrence.  For example, for a large set of events to each 
of which the assessor assigns a probability of 0.8, about 
80% should actually occur if the assessor is well 
calibrated. 
 
Scientific validity of expert judgements 
 
Expert judgements in risk analyses can be demonstrated as 
conforming to accepted scientific norms through the use of 
elicitation schemes such as that developed by Professor R. 
Cooke (Cooke, 1991), which is one of the most widely used 
processes. Use of the level 3 and level 4 methodologies 
developed by the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee 
in the United States (Budnitz et al., 1998) which is analogous 
to Cooke’s method is an alternative.  Cooke’s method is 
particularly attractive as its basis replicates the formal 
scientific method. One of its most valuable attributes is the 
scope it provides for quantifying realistically the spread of 
scientific or engineering uncertainty in relation to any 
parameter of interest. 
 
Cooke’s procedure is usually framed to elicit suitable lower 
and upper percentile confidence estimates from the experts, as 
well as a central or ‘best’ estimate value (which can be the 
mode, mean or median, depending on the distributional 
properties being sought). This aspect of the structured 
elicitation procedure is especially important for those variables 
for which adequate data do not exist for conventional 
statistical analysis.  This is where the need for precise 
differentiation between engineering judgment and expert 
judgment matters. 
 
Here it is vitally important not to confuse ‘scientific validity’ 
(application of the scientific method) with ‘scientific proof’ as 
they are distinctly different concepts.  Many real life decisions 
must be addressed before the scientific community can reach a 
consensus, and this applies to dam safety decisions which are 
fraught with uncertainty.  However, even under conditions of 
great uncertainty, the principles of scientific inference can be 
applied. 
 
The following basic principles, which were formulated as part 
of a research project into models for expert opinion elicitation 
carried out under the auspices of the Dutch Government 
(Cooke, 1991.) are of particular value in risk analysis of dams.  
These principles are: 
 
Reproducibility: It must be possible for scientific peers to 
review and if necessary reproduce all calculations.  This 
entails that the calculation models must be fully specified and 
the ingredient data must be made available. 
Accountability: The source of the expert subjective 
probabilities must be identified (this is particularly true for 
decision-making concerning the safety of the public). 
Empirical Control: Expert probability estimates must, in 
principle, be susceptible to empirical control. 
Neutrality: The method for combining expert opinion should 
encourage experts to state their true opinions. 
Fairness: All experts are treated equally, prior to processing 
the results of observations. 
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One task for proponents of risk analysis for dams is to 
demonstrate how these perfectly reasonable principles are 
applied in their practices.  From an analytical perspective, 
conformance to these principles is particularly important as 
they relate to the fundamental process of estimating 
probabilities and probable states.  Scientific theories can never 
be conclusively verified, but, if a theory is in fact false, then in 
principle it should be possible to conduct a reproducible 
experiment to demonstrate that this is the case.  This process is 
fundamental to empirical control - it is the safeguard against 
the argument that everybody’s subjective probabilities are 
equally valid.  Thus, the application of Cooke’s or an 
equivalent method that replicates the formal scientific method 
in eliciting subjective probabilities from suitably qualified 
experts will meet the requirements for scientific validity. 
 
 
TECHNIQUES OF RISK ANALYSIS 
 
Event tree analysis 
 
The event tree is a graphical construct that shows the logical 
sequence of the occurrence of events in or states of a system. 
Event trees offer the analyst the capability to construct a logic 
model of a system that is visual and therefore is easy to view 
and read, and that provides a qualitative and quantitative 
insight to the system’s operations and reliability. 
 
An event tree can be thought of as a fragility curve 
representation of the system’s response to the loading. The 
fragility curve is treated as primarily reflecting limited 
knowledge of system behaviour, modelled as epistemic 
uncertainty.  Initiating events are brought into the start of the 
event tree to cause the system to respond.  Typically in event 
tree analysis, initiating events are treated as naturally varying 
phenomenon occurring randomly in time. Even though the 
uncertainties associated with external initiating events may be 
attributable to limited knowledge, in practice they are 
normally modelled as due to natural or random variability 
(i.e., as aleatory uncertainty). This implies annual probabilities 
of events of given size occurring or being exceeded, as for 
example, in flood frequency relations or earthquake recurrence 
functions.  
 
It is important to define what the event tree is intended to 
represent as this determines the nature of the variables 
represented in the tree.  The meaning of the term “event” 
should be clearly defined and understood as should the 
description of system states. It will often be necessary to make 
a clear distinction between the state of the system and the state 
of the operating environment of the system as there are often 
important interactions between the two which can be come 
“mixed” in the event tree if sufficient care is not taken. 
 
Originally, event trees were used to represent binary changes 








Figure 2. System states modelled in an event tree 
 
This straightforward notion of binary change of state must be 
modified for application to dams as the states will not always 
be binary. With respect of event trees representing changes of 
state, the general concepts are illustrated in Figure 3.  
Importantly perhaps, the change of state concept provides us 
with a clue as to how internal erosion risk might be quantified 




Figure 3. Generalised event tree representation of “change 
of functional state” 
 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is an apparently straightforward 
endeavour that finds widespread application in many 
industries and businesses. It is an inductive type of analysis 
that, unlike fault tree analysis, is not supported by an extensive 
theoretical basis. ETA is the most widely used form of 
analysis in risk analysis for dam safety, although the lack of 
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theoretical basis means that the correctness of these constructs 
is difficult if not impossible to determine at this time.  
 
Fundamentally, creating an event tree model of a dam is a 
knowledge-based endeavour. Different analysts will have 
different ways of defining events, different ways of linking 
events together, and different ways of estimating parameters 
and assigning probabilities to events. All these things, 
combined with inadequate data and poorly understood models, 
mean that event trees and their numerical results are never 
unique. An event tree reflects a belief structure about a dam, 
about the natural environment within which the dam resides, 
and about the natural and human processes that affect dam 
performance. 
 
The uncertainties that enter an event tree analysis–both in the 
way events are structured in the tree and in the way numerical 
values of probability are assigned to branches have mostly to 
do with limitations in knowledge, not with random processes, 
although for modelling convenience they may be represented 
either or both as natural variations (aleatory uncertainties) and 
knowledge uncertainties (epistemic uncertainties). This is true 
about the external environmental forces acting on a dam, 
about internal response of the dam to those forces, and about 
the estimation of properties and parameter values that enter the 
calculations. 
 
While this does not imply that ETA is not useful in safety 
assessment of dams, it does limit the extent to which it can be 
relied on in an absolute sense in decision-making. 
 
 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is one of the techniques available to 
the engineer conducting a reliability or safety analysis for a 
dam. It is a technique whose theoretical foundation is well-
developed and that has been applied extensively in reliability 
and safety assessments for a wide range of engineered systems 
such as missile launch systems, chemical process facilities, 
nuclear power plants, dams, control systems and computers. In 
addition, the software and the databases available for 
conducting a FTA are sophisticated and add significantly to 
the efficiency of performing a risk analysis.  
 
The fault tree is a graphical construct that shows the logical 
interaction among the elements of a system whose failure 
individually or in combination could contribute to the 
occurrence of a defined undesired event such as a system 
failure. Fault trees offer the analyst the capability to construct 
a logic model of a system that is visual and therefore is easy to 
view and read, and that provides a qualitative and quantitative 
insight to the system’s operations and reliability. FTA is a 
deductive analysis, in which the analyst reasons what can lead 
to the occurrence of a specified undesired event. In a top-down 
manner, a FTA works from the general to the specific. One of 
the early steps in a FTA is to specify a particular but general 
undesired event, such as failure of a system. The analysis then 
proceeds to determine what the specific causes or modes of 
system failure are. 
FTA can play a particularly valuable role in forensic analysis 
of failures of systems, including dam failures.  It can also be 
extremely valuable in mining case histories of failures, be it of 
dams or other engineered systems.  In particular, FTA 
provides a means of demonstrating the validity of 
“explanations” for dam failures. The extensive theoretical 
basis that exists for fault tree analysis, together with the fact 
that FTA does not suffer from the inability to demonstrate the 
correctness of tree structure (as is the case with event trees), 
renders FTA a vastly superior means of explaining failures.  
Any difficulties that arise in explaining case histories will be 
immediately revealed by the logical rules of fault tree 
construction. The fundamental elements of Fault Tree 
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Figure 4. Essential elements of Fault Tree Construction 
 
This does not look overly difficult, so why is it that FTA is not 
the analytical method of choice in the forensic analysis of 
failures of geotechnical structures? I would suggest that the 
problem is not with the method of fault tree analysis per se, 
rather its demands for both data and logical reasoning between 
claim and evidence appear to be at odds with the traditions of 
engineering judgement in geotechnical engineering practice. 
 
One of the most significant problems that arises in 
constructing fault trees of dam failures is the lack of 
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information about the failure because the evidence is literally 
swept away by the dam breach flood.  Unfortunately, any 
inability to construct a fault tree of a dam failure means that 
any account of the failure will be incomplete and therefore not 
necessarily reliable. However, the inability to construct a 
complete fault tree is no reason not to attempt to do the best 
that one can because it is the only way to determine the extent 
to which any account of the failure can be relied on in 









The ability to mechanically model failure mechanisms for 
dams in general remains very weak, and is unlikely to improve 
in the foreseeable future as research into the physics of failure 
mechanisms is extremely limited. From Figure 1, it is clear 
that internal erosion is worth of significant attention, and 
while it has received some attention, spearheaded in recent 
years by Professor Robin Fell at the University of New South 
Wales, much work remains to be done to develop appropriate 
mechanical models of the internal erosion process that can be 
cast in mathematical form. 
 
Most approaches to assessing the propensity for earth dams to 
fail by internal erosion are now based on two design criteria; 
specifically filter criteria and criteria for internal stability of 
the core material. However, it is not at all clear that failure to 
meet certain filter and internal stability criteria means that the 
dam in question has a propensity to fail as a result of internal 
erosion.   
 
This is a manifestation of a more general problem in dam 
safety as many dams do not meet modern safety criteria yet 
they appear to perform quite satisfactorily.  On the other hand, 
conformance to these filter and stability criteria in design and 
material selection does not guarantee that the propensity for 
failure by internal erosion is eliminated because there is 
presently no way of knowing that the as-constructed dam 
actually strictly conforms to the design criteria. Segregation 
during handling and placement are natural phenomena that 
must be considered in any safety assessment of a dam.  Dam 
owners and their engineers face complex questions, the 
solutions to which are not found in design rules, when trying 
to determine the propensity of earth dams to fail by internal 
erosion. 
 
Semi-empiricism dominates the various approaches to 
analysing the propensity of dams to undergo internal erosion.  
I say semi-empiricism because in most cases, it is not possible 
to demonstrate that the methods used conform to the 





“Probability of failure by internal erosion” 
 
The notion of expressing an annual probability of failure of 
earth dams as a result of the internal erosion failure mode has 
been discussed for over 20 years.  The quantification of 
internal erosion risks based on annualised probabilities 
presents particular problems because it is not clear what it 
means to express the probability of failure as an annualized 
rate. The problem arises because the driving force for internal 
erosion is reservoir level, without which there would be no 
water pressure against the upstream face of a dam, no internal 
pore pressure gradients, no seepage, and consequently no 
internal erosion.  However, it is not the fluctuation of reservoir 
level through time that causes internal erosion; a constant high 
reservoir would just as likely, or even more likely, lead to 
internal erosion.  
 
The uncertainties inherent to the analysis of internal erosion in 
a fill dam have somewhat to do with frequencies, and 
somewhat to do with knowledge uncertainties. On the first 
count, many models of piping start with the random presence 
of a “flaw.” This flaw can be one of design or one of 
construction. It is often taken to occur randomly in space 
within the dam. Thus, the flaw is partly an epistemic 
uncertainty (does a flaw exist?), and partly an aleatory 
uncertainty (if so, where?). On the second count, the process 
of internal erosion, even given a flaw, is poorly understood. 
There are significant limitations to the understanding of the 
physics of internal erosion, and thus to the models and 
material properties that apply. These have little to do with 
randomness and almost nothing to do with frequencies in time. 
 
From a risk point of view, two things are uncertain: first, will 
a particular dam under particular load conditions fail by 
internal erosion if left forever to do so, and second, if the 
answer to the first question is, yes, then over what time period 
does this failure unfold? The probability that the dam will fail 
by piping in a given year, t0, is the product of an absolute 
probability, the probability that it can fail by piping at all, and 
of a time-dependent probability of how long the process will 
take (Figure 5).  
 
All these uncertainties may be epistemic, and yet they may 
lead to “annualized” probabilities having to do with 
uncertainties over how long the process takes to complete. 
These annualized probabilities (i.e., the derivatives of the 
cumulative curve) change with time, rising slowly from zero, 
cresting at the most likely time to failure (presuming a failure 
occurs at all), then falling off again. The asymptote of the 
cumulative probability is the absolute probability that piping 
failure occurs at all, which may be less than 1.0. 
 
The extent to which uncertainty dominates many dam safety 
decisions is often used as a reason for not pursuing risk 
analysis of dams.  This is unfortunate and grossly erroneous as 
the same theoretical and scientific principles apply regardless 
of how great the uncertainty.  A decision problem with a little 
uncertainty must be dealt with in the same fundamental way as 
one with a great deal of uncertainty.  The only difference will 
be the extent to which the results will be uncertain.  The above 
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text demonstrates that we understand the issues and how they 
should be considered in analysis, but not much more and 
Figure 5 illustrates the form of the analytical result. 
 
The ability to characterize internal erosion risks will not 
improve until an understanding of the physics of internal 
erosion improves. This is not a risk analysis issue, it is a 
mechanics issue. In the mean time, the best that can be done is 
to try to understand the nature of time-dependency in 
describing the internal erosion risk (and risks similar to it, in 
this sense).   
 
The loads driving a potential internal erosion failure (i.e., 
reservoir levels) may or may not have a frequency aspect to 
them, but if they do, it can be ignored. The process of internal 
erosion depends on physics and material values about which 
there is limited knowledge and thus considerable uncertainty, 
but internal erosion failure does not occur instantaneously. It 



























Figure 5: Probability of failure by internal erosion 
(Hartford and Baecher, 2004) 
 
Against this background, it is clear that the notion of the 
annualized probability of failure by internal erosion is 
problematic.  This means that establishing numerical criteria 
for internal erosion risk assessment is not the straightforward 
matter that the contemporary literature might suggest. 
 
The internal erosion failure mode is just one of a general set of 
problems faced by dam owners that arises from the general 
uncertainties in the design, construction and performance of 
dams.  It is a complex area where dam owners necessarily 
should hold somewhat different degrees of confidence in the 
functional performance of the dam than the designers and 
constructors of the dam.  This is because the designers 
working in their individual engineering disciplines should be 
confident with their designs and, with proper quality control 
are entitled to assume that their colleagues have “got their 
parts right”, and that the constructor “has got everything 
right”, whereas the dam owner cannot assume perfection.  
Rather, it is the extent to which the design and construction 
are not quite perfect with respect to the design assumptions 
and their validity that should be of concern to dam owners.       
 
The increasing use of probabilistic risk analysis in dam 
engineering has led to a realization that many of the 
approaches for modelling and analyzing failure processes for 
dams are inadequate. The event tree is one modelling 
technique that has been used in attempts to model dam failure 
processes.  That is, there are event trees of the type wherein 
the “events” may be described, but the probabilities associated 
with those events are not readily estimated from existing 
understanding of the physics of the processes and the 
knowledge of the dam.  As a result, estimates of probability of 
internal erosion are highly subjective (that is of the mind) even 
though the process of internal erosion is entirely physical and 
in principle measurable. This has led to the observation that 
the profession needs to develop models that are more helpful 
in analyzing actual mechanisms of failure rather than focusing 
on comparison to design standards. Internal erosion is one of 
the mechanisms of failure is one such failure mode where 
significant improvements in scientific knowledge are required. 
Failures due to internal erosion are not easily modelled, and 
even if they can be modelled approximately, the estimation of 
risk presents at least a significant a challenge.  Different 
workers in the field of internal erosion risk analysis have 
developed event tree structures that are slightly different 
variations of the same construct.  However, developing well-
structured event trees to model internal erosion is difficult, in 
part because the mechanics of the process is poorly understood 
and therefore difficult to represent, and in part because the 
nodes of an event tree represent transitions from one system 
state to one or more new states. Typically, for event tree 
models of functional states, outcomes of precursor events are 
binary, Functional or Not Functional (Success/Failure, 
Yes/No).  Correctly accounting for the timing of the events is 
a significant issue in event tree analysis, which is more 
amenable to representation of instantaneous state transitions 
rather than time dependent changes in functional state. The 
failure logic sequence might actually change depending on the 
rate at which interdependent “changes in states” in the systems 
and its sub-systems take place.   
 
In the case of internal erosion, the “system state” changes 
from “fully functional” to “completely failed” in a gradual or 
even sporadic way.  Precisely what “the system” is, needs to 
be carefully defined before change in system state can be 
defined, and this is not an easy task.  For example, the system 
to be modelled in the event tree could just be the filter, or just 
the core, or the core and filter as interdependent sub-systems, 
or the core, filter and drains as interdependent sub-systems. 
Then the definition of what the physical “change of state” of 
“the system” is and the time at which the “change of state” 
occurs are particularly important if internal erosion is to be 
modelled using event tree techniques.  
 
Not withstanding the facts that failures due to internal erosion 
are not easily modelled, and that developing well-structured 
event trees is difficult, all safety assessments of earth and rock 
fill dams need to address internal erosion.  Risk analysis 
provides the only available means of expressing what is 
known and what is uncertain in a rational way.  That an 
internal erosion risk analysis might be dominated by 
knowledge uncertainties is simply a fact that must be dealt 
with.  However, the preponderance of uncertainty is not a 
 SOAP 6               13 
reason for not attempting a coherent, well-structured risk 
analysis. 
 
Recent work has determined that the notion of utilising the 
historic frequency of dam failures that are due to internal 
erosion, while intuitive and clearly applicable to populations 
of dams, is problematic with respect to individual dams.  This 
is not the only method of estimating the probability of failure 
by internal erosion that appears to have fallen from favour.  
The methods for quantifying internal erosion risk using what 
might be loosely termed as subjective Bayesian prior 
probabilities and Kent Charts that emerged in the 1980’s and 
1990’s appear to be diminishing in the literature and are not 
mentioned anywhere in Internal Erosion of Dams and their 
Foundations (Fell and Fry, ibid.). 
 
These observations suggest that despite valiant efforts and 
significant investment, the apparently straightforward method 
of quantifying the probability of failure by internal erosion 
using event tree analysis and the subjective probability 
interpretation as encoded in Kent Charts. A radically different, 
soil mechanics-based approach appears to be the next frontier 




EVENT TREE MODELLING OF INTERNAL EROSION 
RISKS 
 
Event tree modelling of internal erosion risks (e.g. Whitman, 
1984) began to emerge in practice in the early to mid 1990’s.  
However, the engineering and scientific communities have not 
been able to accept these methods as being appropriate and 
valid risk analysis constructs.  This lack of general acceptance 
is an important factor to be taken into consideration by dam 
owners dealing with internal erosion. 
 
Typically, the event tree models of internal erosion that have 
emerged over the past fifteen years are of the form illustrated 
in Figure 6, which is subtly different from the “functional 
state” concepts of Figure 2. Refer to Hartford and Baecher 
(2004), pages 208 – 213, for an account of the early evolution 









Figure 6. Published internal erosion risk analysis models 
(Hartford and Baecher, 2004.) 
 
The process illustrated in the influence diagram in Figure 6 is 
a more specific version of the more generic deterioration 
process form proposed by the researchers at the University of 
New South Wales (UNSW) (Fell et al., ibid) (Figure 7). The 
UNSW 4-step generic process is based on the generic 
deterioration process that applies generally to engineered and 
natural systems, and is not specific to internal erosion. The 
published models referenced by Hartford and Baecher is 
readily represented in the UNSW model (Figure 8).   
 
 
Figure 7. UNSW model of internal erosion (Fell et al., ibid) 
 
The “detection” and “intervention” steps, which are 
sometimes included in contemporary risk analysis practices 
are not internal states of the “dam/reservoir” system and 
should normally be exclude from the risk analysis process.  
Rather, these interventions are external to the dam and are 
more correctly associated with risk management measures. 
 
 
Figure 8. Contemporary internal erosion model 
 
Any intervention must necessarily result in an “imposed 
change in the system” that is not in any way related to the 
process of internal erosion. From a risk management 
perspective, it is better to construct the “base-case” event tree 
without consideration of detection and intervention as it is not 
possible to determine the probabilities of success if one does 
not know the seriousness of the problem at the time of 
detection or the effectiveness of any subsequent intervention.  
There are also good reasons to suspect that the inclusion of 
detection and intervention nodes in an event tree will result in 
an overly optimistic view of the level of risk. 
 
In terms if the “State-of-the-Art” of ETA, the state of the 
system should be fully defined by a logic tree prior to the 
initiation of the failure mode in order to ensure that the event 
tree is restricted to being a representation of the system 
response. This approach is distinctly different to the event tree 
analysis practices for dams that emerged in the 1990’s where 
pre-existing system states were often represented at nodes 
within the event tree.  
 
At the outset, the state of the system prior to the occurrence of 
the initiating event must be defined. This means that the 
complete set of states that the system normally operates in, for 
example reservoir elevation, operating temperature, etc. are 
defined prior to constructing the event tree. It is also important 
that the knowledge (epistemic) uncertainties concerning the 
pre-existing state be represented if they influence the analysis 
of the system response. Logic trees provide a useful way of 
representing system states where each end branch of the logic 
tree describes a pre-existing system state. 
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When it is necessary to consider more than one precursor 
system state and/or uncertainty in the precursor state, it is 
necessary to use several event trees and to condition each 
event tree for each failure mode by all possible system states. 
Correctly accounting for the timing of the events is a 
significant issue in event tree analysis, which is more 
amenable to representation of instantaneous state transitions 
rather than time dependent changes in functional state. The 
analyst should be aware that, as is the case in some nuclear 
power applications, the failure logic sequence might change 
depending on the rate at which interdependent changes in 
states take place. 
 
The use of event trees in modelling internal erosion failures, 
presents a number of difficult questions, including the absence 
of scientifically verified models of the start and continuation 
of internal erosion. It also suffers a lack of good information 
about the as-constructed internal condition of most dams.  The 
failure of a dam by internal erosion during first filling, 
illustrates another aspect of the problem of characterising 
internal erosion risks as in most cases (some flood control 
dams being an exception) first filling of a dam is not 
necessarily a random event, and thus is not necessarily 
modelled as an annualized, random (aleatory) variable.  Thus, 
the initiating event for internal erosion is usually associated 
with flaws or deterioration.  While event tree analysis is 
especially well suited to representing the potential 
consequences of natural hazards; it is less well suited for 
dealing with internal initiating events with time-dependent 
failure mechanisms. 
 
Against this background, and with reference to Figure 2 and 3, 
I would like to propose a generalised “change of state” 
approach to event tree construction for internal erosion, where 
the time dependent functional state of the “core-filter-drain” 





Figure 9. Time-dependent functional state framework for 
internal erosion event trees 
 
The “change of state’ concept is distinctly different from the 
contemporary models illustrated in Figure 6 through 8 and as 
described in Internal Erosion of Dams and their Foundations 
(Fell and Fry, ibid.). 
 
This “change of functional state” approach is a generalisation 
of the “functional process” model that provides a means of 
decomposing the functional state into time based steps.  It is 
aimed at overcoming the limitations of the conventional 
approach to event tree analysis of this important failure 
mechanism.  
 
The functional elements of the dam that are critical to the 
analysis of the probability of failure by internal erosion are; 




Figure 10. Spatial model of earth fill dam 
 
The spatial model can be transformed to a functional model as 
illustrated in Figure 11. The core-filter-drain subsystem is 
represented generically in the event tree shown in Figure 9 as 
sub-systems 1, 2 and 3.  Thus, if one can determine the 
functional states of the core, the filter and the drain, in Figure 




Figure 11. Functional model of internal flow control  
 
While the sub-systems in the event tree have been arranged in 
terms of their relative spatial positions, the states of each sub-
system are matters of knowledge and therefore the 
uncertainties and associated probabilities are epistemic in 
nature.  Here I propose that the sub-tree for the three element 
(core- filter-drain) sub-system can be considered as a 
graphical representation of statements about the joint 
probabilities of variables that can be modelled as random at 
time “ti” , then, from the total probability theorem, the order of 
the events is not a consideration.  Thus the spatial arrangement 
of the event tree nodes for time “ti” does not imply that the 
changes of state of the core-filter-drain occur sequentially. 
 
By focusing event trees for internal erosion on the time-
dependent functional state of the critical defensive 
components of the dam, I suggest that it may be possible to 
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transfer these heuristics and biases from event tree 
construction to the mechanics of internal erosion (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. “Functional state” approach to event tree construction for internal erosion 
Ideally, to characterise the functional state one must have 
details of the fundamental properties of the dam and the 
physical manner in which internal flow of seepage water is 
controlled over time.  To characterise the functional state, one 
would conceivably determine fundamental soil properties of 
the core, filter and drain such as density, void ratio/specific 
volume, permeability, friction angle etc.  
 
If these properties are known, then it would appear reasonable 
to apply the theory of critical state soil mechanics as a means 
of characterising the “physical state” of the key elements of 
the dam.  Once the physical state is characterised, its time 
dependent functional state could be expected to follow directly 
from consideration of the relationship between flow control 
capacity and the specific volume and permeability of the soil.  
 
While I do not consider that determination of the physical 
state of the interior of the core, filter and drain of a dam will 
be straightforward, I do consider that research efforts in this 
direction, such as cross-hole seismic tomography, and other 
methods of physical state determination such as temperature 






The soil mechanics of the internal erosion problem 
 
By reasoning from first principles, the problem of internal 
erosion is an effective stress problem because particle 
transportation (internal erosion) occurs when the tractive 
forces of the seepage water on the soil particles overcomes the 
frictional resistance that holds individual particles in the soil 
matrix. Also by reasoning from first principles, the movement 
of particles of a unit volume of soil results in a change in the 
void ratio (and therefore specific volume). This change in 
specific volume is a “change in state” making the Critical 
State Soil Mechanics (CSSM) family of models a suitable 
choice for analysis of the problem. 
 
Given that internal erosion is an effective stress problem 
where the important parameters pertain to the state of stress as 
determined by (p’, q, u) and the tractive forces that the flowing 
water applies to the soil particles, it seems that the relationship 
between the state of stress and the pore pressure would be an 
important factor in dealing with the problem of internal 
erosion risk analysis.  The theory of Critical State Soil 
Mechanics (CSSM) (Schofield and Worth, 1968) can be used 
to calculate pore pressures in laboratory tests and in the field.  
Since internal erosion involves a change in dry density as fines 
are lost, that can be represented in terms of a “change in 
state”, and because this change in state can be related to 
specific volume v, a fundamental soil property, it appears that 
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it would be worth exploring if critical state soil mechanics 
theory, coupled with a dynamic change in state event tree 
analysis might provide a rational means of dealing with the 
problem of internal erosion risk analysis for dams.   
 
The only obvious problem at the outset of this exploration is 
that the type of many soil types that dams are constructed from 
do not conform to the stress-strain and deformation 
predictions of theoretical models such as the Cam-clay model. 
Such a problem would typically be a “show-stopper” in a 
practical sense and practicing engineers have long been able to 
reject these theoretical models as too idealised to be of 
practical value.  I took a different view because there is 
nothing fundamentally wrong with the CSSM concept or its 
theoretical foundations, and it has been applied to certain soils 
encountered in engineering practice. 
 
The tri-axial test is a good place to start to explore the 
relationship between (p’, q, u). It also gives an opportunity to 
explore the differences between the behaviour of real soils in 
the tri-axial test and the CSSM Cam-clay and modified-Cam 
clay theoretical model predictions.  
 
Although the conditions under which internal erosion of dams 
occurs is overall a “drained” condition, un-drained tri-axial 
tests on soils used in the cores of dams provide a useful 
starting point for a theoretical investigation. Whether or not 
the process of internal erosion at its early stages involves 
transitions from un-drained conditions to drained conditions 
back to un-drained conditions will not be discussed here, 
rather it will suffice to note that the understanding of the 
behaviour of soils used in dam construction under un-drained 
conditions is a necessary element of a comprehensive 
understanding of how soils behave in engineered structures 
such as dams.   
 
In un-drained tri-axial tests on saturated soil specimens, the 
excess pore pressure generated is made up of two components: 
one component due to the response of the soil to the shearing 
process represented by ∆q, the change in shear stress; the 
second component due to the change in mean total stress ∆p 
applied to the specimen (Figure 13): 
 
pqu ∆∆α∆ += …(Eq.1) 
 
As mentioned previously, many soils used in engineering 
practice do not exhibit the behaviour of theoretical CSSM 
models, with many soils showing both a compressive 
behaviour at very small strains and a dilative behaviour at 













Figure 13.  Relationship between (p’,q,u) for well-graded 
soils in the tri-axial test  
 
While this might challenge some of the tenets of the CSSM 
family of models and other models, it will suffice to note that 
the soil remains in compression until it approaches and then 
sharply transitions to a more or less constant (p,’‐q) 
relationship (approaching the critical state). 
 
From the experimental observations of the pore pressure 
response of tri-axial tests on two quite different engineering 
soils with similar well-graded particle size distributions 
(Figure 14), I observed a linear relationship between generated 
pore pressure and mobilised friction over the portion of the 







=  …(Eq. 2) 
 
where K is a constant for a particular soil (and can be derived 
from the tri-axial test data). To ensure that this observation 
was not simply an artefact of my testing procedure and the 
soils involved, I examined the results of similar tests carried 




Figure 14. Relationship between generated pore pressure 
and mobilised friction from un-drained tri-axial tests on 
two well graded soils with different origins and other 
properties 
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Figure 15.  Relationship between generated pore pressure 
and mobilised friction from un-drained tri-axial tests on 




These results indicate that the linear relationship between 
mobilised friction and pore water pressure under un-drained 
conditions was not simply an artefact of the soils that I was 
testing or the way that they were being tested and suggested 
that a more detailed theoretical treatment would be 
worthwhile.  Since the clay soil shown in Figure 15 can be 
successfully modelled in the CSSM framework, it seemed that 
perhaps this observation might open up the opportunity to 
explore one of the missing links between theoretical soils and 
the behaviour of soils used in dam engineering practice.  
 
In any un-drained tri-axial test starting at an isotropic pressure 
(p=p’=po’), the following relationship holds: 
pʹ
qʹpu o −+= 3  
 
This equation can be combined with (Eq. 2) giving the 




2 =+−− pʹʹpʹKqppʹpʹq oo  …(Eq. 3) 
 





ooo −=−−−−  
…(Eq. 4) 
 
Equation 4 is now in the standard from for the equation of a 





o −+=  
and 
ʹKppʹ o3=  
 
Thus, the un-drained effective stress path is part of a 
hyperbola passing through the points (po’,0), and by inspection 
(0,0).  It should be noted that po’ has the role of “normalising”, 
the effective stress path in the sense that the basic geometric 
shape of the curve is the same for different values of po’.  Thus 
far, there has been no reliance on CSSM. Rather, on the basis 
of experimental observations and reasoning mathematically 
from first principles, it has been possible to determine the 
shape of the un-drained effective stress path of saturated 
engineering soils under conditions of compression in the tri-
axial test.  The conditions of the test are such that a soil mass 
transitions from stable state to an unstable state in (p’,  q) 
space.  In general, and in terms of CSSM theory, the state of 
the soil mass is represented in (p’, q,  v) space (as noted above, 
v is the specific volume).    
 
The above equations can now be introduced into the CSSM 
framework. The equation of the stable state boundary surface 
(SSBS) can now be obtained by associating the intersection of 
the hyperbola with the pʹ  axis (i.e. the point po’, 0) with the 
corresponding point on the isotropic normal consolidation line 
(NCL). 
 
ʹpNv oo λ−=  …(Eq. 5) 
 
where λ is the slope of the isotropic NCL in a (v,  lnp’)plot 
and N is the value of v when po’ = 1 kPa. Equation (5) can now 
be used to eliminate po’, from (4), setting q/p’ = η after a little 




qpʹln()K1ln(Nvo −−−−= ληλ  
Since vo can take on any value, we can drop the subscript to 




qpʹln()K1ln(Nv −−−−= ληλ  …(Eq. 6) 
 
This SSBS equation can be compared with the corresponding 
Cam clay and modified Cam clay SSBS equations (Britto and 
Gunn, 1987). 
 
Cam Clay SSBS. 
)1)((v Μ
ηκλΓλ −−+=  
 
Modified Cam Clay SSBS. 
)})(1ln()2){ln((v 2Μ
ηκλΓλ +−−+=  
 
The relevant CSSM soil constants are: 
Γ:- specific volume of soil at the Critical State for p’ = 1.0 kPa 
λ, and κ:- are the slopes of the compression and swelling lines 
in isotropic consolidation tests 
Μ:- the Critical State friction constant  
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The equation of the yield locus for hyperbolic Cam-clay can 
be obtained by taking the intersection of the elastic κ-line 
equation with the SSBS.  If pc’  is the pre-consolidation 
pressure which specified the size of the yield locus, then the 
value of v corresponding to this pre-consolidation pressure on 
the isotropic NCL is given by:  
 
ʹpNv cc λ−=  
 
In addition the standard relations for the κ-line are  
 
ʹplnvv cc κκ += and, 
 
pʹlnvv κκ +=  (see Figure. 16) 
 
Manipulating these last three equations to eliminate vκ and vc: 
)
pʹ
ʹpln(ʹplnNv cc κ+λ−= …(Eq. 7) 
v  is now eliminated from (6) and (7) and after some 
manipulation the equation of the yield locus for hyperbolic 







































Figure 16. Generalised consolidation characteristics of 
soils 
 
The form of the yield locus is given in Figure 17. Importantly, 
throughout this derivation of the yield locus it has not been 
necessary to assume or know the value of the critical state 
friction parameter Μ. However, Μ can be calculated from the 
soil parameters already calculated because to ensure the zero 
dilatancy condition the critical state line must intersect the 
yield locus where the tangent is horizontal. This is achieved by 
differentiating Eq. 8 and setting the resulting expression for 
dq/dp’ to zero.  This leads to a quadratic equation in (pcs’/pc’)Λ 
where: 
λ
κ−=Λ 1  
 













From which the ratio (pcs’/pc’) (see Figure 17) can be obtained. 
Substituting back into Eq. 8, the value of q at the critical state 
is obtained and hence Μ = q/p’. 
 
At this point, a complete specification of the response of this 
model material to any implied loading in the tri-axial test as all 
of the basic equations of the hyperbolic Cam-clay model have 
been provided. There is no reason that this basic model cannot 
be extended to cover all conditions to which Cam clay and 
modified-Cam clay have been applied.  Since, the hyperbolic 
Cam clay model provides a good fit to the pore pressure 
response in the tri-axial test for diverse natural soil types, 
some of which are used in the construction of dams, 
hyperbolic Cam-clay provides a potential model for predicting 
soil behaviour where the change of state is “change in v” and 




Figure 17. Yield locus for hyperbolic Cam clay 
 
Thus, it is possible that hyperbolic Cam-clay might provide a 
theoretical soil mechanics framework to examine the problem 
of “change in state” associated with internal erosion of dams. 
If it were possible to determine v at various locations within 
the core of a dam, then by re-arranging the above equations, 
perhaps it might be possible to determine the proximity of unit 
elements of core soil within a dam relative to the core’s Stable 
State Boundary Surface.  If this were possible, and if it were 
possible to measure in some way “change in specific volume” 
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with time, then the idea of risk analysis of the internal erosion 
failure mode might become a reality. Interestingly, Popielski 
et al. (2002) have proposed that the Modified Cam Clay 
Model provides an analytical framework for the problem and 
have performed finite element modelling of the problem 
within the CSSM theoretical framework. 
 
 
PART III  
DETECTION OF CHANGES IN STATE 
 
The final part of my paper outlines a field experiment aimed at 
determining contemporary capability to monitor the seepage 
through the core of a dam from the surface and to indirectly 
detect these “changes in ‘specific volume’ state”.  Other 
methods of testing such as cross-hole seismic tomography can 
also be used to detect changes in density through changes in 
cross-hole velocities.  
 
At the outset, I referred to the inferential nature of dam safety 
assessment where the engineer is required to take incomplete 
and uncertain data and draw conclusions as to the performance 
of the dam up to that point in time. The engineer is also 
expected to forecast the performance of the dam for the 
foreseeable future. As mentioned at the outset, all of this 
involves hypothesising and, in the case of dams, often little in 
the way of hypothesis testing as it is often at a minimum 
unwise to embark on tests that cannot be terminated without 
doing any harm.  Hypothesising from direct evidence is 
difficulty enough, doing so from indirect evidence is even 
more difficult and the complexities should not be under-
estimated. This experiment is at the extreme of indirect 
hypothesising in dam performance analysis. 
 
Typically, measurements of earth dam performance are done 
very indirectly.  For example, the functional effectiveness of 
the seepage control functionality of the core might be measure 
at the downstream end of the drain (several hundred metres 
from the core), or even more indirectly through the response 
of piezometers in the downstream shell and or drain.  Surface 
measurements of “properties at depth” such as Ground 
Penetrating Radar (GPR), Resistivity, and Self Potential (SP) 
are amongst the most indirect monitoring methods available. 
The questions that arise are, “what are the signals from these 
monitoring instruments telling us?” and “what are they not 
telling us?” about the “changes in state” of the dam. 
 
These are not usual problems in science, as the statements of 
“what the signals are/are not telling us” are in the form of 
hypotheses, and are dealt with in terms of hypothesis testing.  
The idea of conducting “blind tests” and “double blind tests” 
to test hypotheses is common in the scientific method, with the 
view to determining of the hypothesis can be falsified. These 
tests are essentially mandatory and taken for granted in the 
sciences.  However, such tests are rarely conducted in civil 
engineering outside the laboratory and it is extremely difficult, 




BLIND TEST OF SEEPAGE MONITORING CAPABILITY 
 
If one accepts the hypothesis that under conditions of constant 
hydraulic head, changes in seepage volume are indicative of a 
“change in state” within the dam, then monitoring of seepage 
within the body of the dam should be of considerable value.  
The only reliable way to determine the meaning of the signals 
from these monitoring methods is to test the method in a 
controlled way under the full spectrum of conditions where the 
method might be used. The following describes just one such 
test with the view to illustrating what must be done to gain 
confidence in inferences from dam monitoring instruments. 
 
Geo-electrical and temperature profiling methods of seepage 
detection in earth dams emerged as potentially promising non-
invasive methods of monitoring leakage in through cores in 
earth dams in the 1990’s. During the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s, significant research work on application of these 
methods to earth dams was carried out in Canada, Sweden and 
the United States.  While not directly related to detection of 
the “change in specific volume state” that is of specific 
interest, an increase in seepage volume is indirectly indicative 
of “change in state” and internal erosion.  
 
 
The test dam 
 
EBL Kompetanse (EBL), the Norwegian Electricity Industry 
Association conducted a major research investigation into the 
stability and breaching of rockfill dams in 2002 - 2005.  This 
involved constructing and testing to failure a number of 5m -
6m high, 40m long zoned rockfill dams.  This was a very 
ambitious project that led to very valuable and significant 
improvements in the scientific knowledge of rockfill dam 
stability, including overtopping erosion failure mechanisms 
and the internal erosion mechanism.  This important EBL 
initiative was also incorporated in the European Union’s 
IMPACT project that was investigating Extreme Flood 
Processes and Uncertainty.  
 
Exploratory discussions concerning the possibility of adding a 
“blind test” of emergent Resistivity, SP and Temperature 
monitoring methods to the existing testing programme were 
held with EBL’s representatives.  These discussions were 
sufficiently fruitful to permit BC Hydro, ELFORSK, the 
research branch of the Swedish Electricity Industry and EBL 
Kompetanse, as represented by Statkraft Grøner (now Sweco 
Grøner) and advised by Professor Kaare Høeg, to agree to 
proceed with a “blind test” of these emerging seepage 
monitoring methods for earth dams. 
 
The “blind test” concept 
 
The objective of the “blind test project” was to simulate the 
outward manifestations of internal erosion by building “one or 
more zones of relatively high leakage” into the core of a zoned 
earth/rockfill dam, and ask a specialist in these emerging 
detection technologies to find it (or them)!  Put simply, we 
were challenging the technology and its proponents to 
demonstrate its scientific credentials and to demonstrate that it 
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The basic design was modified to incorporate zones of high 
seepage through the core.  A total of three zones with high 
seepage characteristics were hidden in the dam. As is clear 
from the measured seepage in the seepage measuring weir, the 
seepage flows closely follow the reservoir elevation.  Needless 
to say, the weather was not fully co-operative and it was 
necessary to account for the effects of the periods of rain. 
is not simply “high tech water-divining”! Of course, one has to 
also account for the complications of nature which make it 
impossible to build a dam precisely in accordance with the 
design!    
 
While the proposed project was solely motivated by scientific 
inquiry, it became clear that pursuit of such inquiry involved 
serious consideration of many aspects of dam ownership and 
operation including; complex ownership arrangements; 
financial and environmental risk management and risk transfer 
arrangements; design and construction challenges. Some went 
far beyond “good practice” considerations with questions like 
“you want me to design what!?”, and reactions like “you have 
to be crazy to try and build a “defective dam!”; on top of all of 
the usual complexities and challenges of dam ownership and 
operation.   
 
Overall, we succeeded in realistically simulating many of the 
conditions that we are normally faced with in dam surveillance 
including; the age-old problem that those interpreting the 
monitoring data normally lacking much of the information that 
they would like to have about the design and construction of 
existing dams; the influence of weather effects; construction 
anomalies; short periods to take measurements; and, 
interpretation difficulties due to uncertainty and necessarily 
incomplete data sets. From the perspective of the “blind test”, 
the dam leaked perfectly (Figure 19). Full details of the blind 
test are provided in the ELFORSK report 
DAMMSÄKERHET, Internal Erosion Detection at the 
Røsvatn Test Site.  (Johansson et al., 2005). 
 
For the blind test to succeed, and over and above all of the 
considerations involved in dam design and construction, we 
needed; 
o A dam designed and built such that it would leak, as if 
undergoing internal erosion, in realistic and measurable 
way without failing;  
 
 
o Have zones of seepage that would provide a fair but 
strong challenge to the technology; 
 
 
o To ensure that the locations of the defects remained 
unknown to everyone except those involved in the design 






The test dam  











Central moraine core (fines > 25%; dmax<60mm) constructed 
in layers with a 4 ton vibratory roller.  
 
 
A: Downstream rock fill support (0-500mm, d10>10mm)   
B: Upstream rock fill support (300-400mm)   
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Photo 1. Construction of “hidden defects” 
 
Outcome   
 
The test provided important corroboration of the value of 
temperature measurement methods in seepage monitoring 
detection.  It provided encouraging results concerning the 
value of resistivity methods, especially during initial 
saturation of the core of the dam. While the results for self-
potential were less encouraging, they were not negative 
suggesting that further research might be beneficial in 
assisting arriving at a conclusion as to the role of the self-
potential method in seepage monitoring of dams. 
 
From the perspective of a dam owner, the results indicate that 
increased reliance on temperature measurement methods in 
practice appear warranted.  The prospects of the use of 
resistivity methods for long term monitoring remain 
promising, although more work on calibration is warranted.  
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The weight of evidence to support heavy reliance on self-
potential methods remains low. 
 
The importance of constructing realistic dams to calibrate 
“change in state” monitoring capability is now recognised and 
is achievable.  Full scale calibration tests can obviously be 





The safety assessment of dams involves the engineer taking 
incomplete and uncertain data and drawing conclusions as to 
the performance of the dam up to that point in time and for the 
foreseeable future.  The entire process is inferential requiring 
the use of inductive logic. Inductive logic pertains to 
arguments that are not certain, and inductive logic analyses 
inductive arguments (hypotheses) using probability. It is 
simply impossible to be certain that a dam is “safe” in an 
absolute sense. 
 
The scientific understanding of the inductive process as is 
required for dam safety assessment has changed dramatically 
since Casagrande first introduced the notion or calculated risk 
in geotechnical engineering and since it emerged in the 
practices.  We now know that risk analysis for dams involves 
a combination of philosophy of science (reasoning under 
uncertainty), probabilistic mathematics, natural hazard 
analysis, soil mechanics, and, dam performance data 
collection, interpretation and analysis.  We also know that the 
type of expert judgement utilised in risk analysis for dams is 
distinctly different to the “engineering judgement” used 
commonly in geotechnical engineering. 
 
Together the recent exposition of the philosophical and 
scientific nature of probability and risk as they apply in dam 
safety assessment together with the explicit demands for 
scientific validity has exposed some significant gaps between 
the contemporary capability to characterise the risk associated 
with earth dams, and the regulatory, public and legal 
expectations. The public, political and regulatory expectations 
concerning the logic and scientific validity of safety claims 
and the transparency of the process of arriving at these claims 
is a matter that dam owner, their engineers, dam safety 
regulators and the profession must address.  To do so will 
require involvement of experts from different domains outside 
geotechnical engineering, and engineering in general. 
 
The matter of scientific validity of risk analyses in the safety 
assessment of dams is not a matter of argument about 
“subjective” and “objective” per se when it comes to “belief-
type probability” as such arguments are little more than mud-
slinging. Rather, and while “belief-type” probability is central 
to the safety assessment process, there are many variations 
belief-type or “Bayesian” probability between two extremes; 
the “personal type” and “logical type”; and since in theory 
apparently, there are 46,656 ways to be a Bayesian (Hacking, 
2001).  Therefore it is necessary for the analyst to be explicit 
where in this spectrum a specific statement of belief 
probability lies.  Any policy-maker, regulator of member of 
the public is obviously entitled to know where in this spectrum 
any probability that they are presented with lies! However, 
Bayes’ Theorem is the unifying construct across all belief-type 
probability and it is central to applications of personal 
probability as it provides the logical basis for individuals to 
update their personal beliefs as new information becomes 
available.  Importantly, Bayes rule doesn’t help “Bayesians” 
to come to an initial position about their “belief probabilities”, 
it just enables them to change their minds in a logical way as 
new information becomes available. 
 
Despite strenuous efforts, the use of semi-empirical design 
rules in the analysis of risks associated with dams remains 
unsatisfactory and there is no reason to expect that it these 
design rules will ever provide a satisfactory means of 
analysing internal erosion or other failure modes, as they are 
aimed at conservatively avoiding failure states.  The only 
thing that compliance with design rules can provide us with is 
some degree of comfort that the dam should perform 
satisfactorily, and conversely, failure to comply with design 
rules should create a corresponding degree of discomfort. The 
best that can be done using these semi-empirical rules in risk 
analysis for dam safety at present is a verbal statement of 
perceived relative likelihood - qualitative “degrees of belief” - 
whatever that means.  Suggestions that these senses can be 
transformed into quantitative probabilities by means of Kent 
Charts that are meaningful and with attendant indicia of 
reliability are misplaced and obsolete.   
 
I have proposed that the Critical State Soil Mechanics 
framework that utilises a hyperbolic Stable State Boundary 
Surface may provide a suitable approach to developing a soil 
mechanics solution to the problem of internal erosion.  I have 
also indicated the nature of the field testing required to 
validate inferences from dam performance monitoring data. 
 
Finally, I do not see this new position as being at odds with 
what Casagrande proposed for risk analysis for dams. After 
all, it was Casagrande who discovered the concept of 
“shearing at constant volume” as subsequently formalised in 
the Critical State family of models, and it was also Casagrande 
who proposed that calculated risk had an important role to 
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